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THE RELATIONSHIP OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
TO TOXIC WASTES: A SELECTIVE STUDY
Richard A. Westin* and Sanford E. Gaines**
I. ORIENTATION
Every year, American industry generates about 250 million tons
of wastes considered hazardous to human health and the en-
vironment.' Some hazardous waste is industrial wastewater,
which generators treat and then discharge into rivers, lakes, and
bays, leading to toxic contamination of many water bodies. 2 Some
of the waste is incinerated, 3 emitting small amounts of toxic
substances into the atmosphere. 4 Under current and past prac-
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ation Tax Section's Acid Rain Task Force. B.A., 1967, Columbia College; M.B.A., 1968,
Columbia University; J.D., 1972, University of Pennsylvania. -
** Associate Professor & Director, Environmental Liability Law Program, University of
Houston Law Center. A.B., 1967, M.A., 1974, J.D., 1974, Harvard. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the capable assistance of Michele Allen, Houston, 1990.
1 Recent estimates range from 247 to 266 million tons depending on how the estimate was
made and what wastes were included. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: A VIEW TOWARD THE NINETIES 158-65 (1987) [hereinafter STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT]. Even as a legal matter the definition of hazardous waste varies in context.
Compare Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1982)
(defines hazardous waste in terms of toxicity, persistence, degradability, flammability, and
corrosiveness) with Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (defines hazardous substances
in terms of lists of substances under various environmental statutes).
2 According to one study, 22% of hazardous wastes are released to sewers or surface waters.
STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 165 (citing a study by the Congressional
Budget Office).
s In 1983, the estimate was one percent but that figure has probably increased as land
disposal has been restricted. Id.
4 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.343 (1987) (permits small quantities of toxic emissions). See also
Nash, Assessing the Health Risks From Municipal Waste Incineration: An Example From
Philadelphia, ENVIRONMENTAL IMiPAcT ASSESSMENT REVIEW, Sept. 1987, at 249.
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS
tices, the largest portion of hazardous waste ends up in land-
fills, where it remains a potential environmental threat for decades
to come. 5
With the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)6 in 1976, Congress began to regulate the disposal of haz-
ardous waste. It followed this initiative in 1980 with the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA or Superfund), 7 which tackled the problem of cleaning
old waste sites. In their original form, both solid waste laws reflected
a technological optimism that the country could safely continue pro-
fligate production of waste materials so long as it applied better
technology (like double liners in landfills) and cleaned up the old,
abandoned dumps.
In the 1980s, it became apparent to Congress that no disposal
systems could guarantee perpetual containment. Regulation of treat-
ment and disposal of waste, while important, was therefore simply
not enough. As a result, Congress broadened the attack and shifted
the focus from palliative to preventive measures. For example, the
1984 amendments to RCRA8 promote treatment and destruction of
hazardous waste through a phased-in prohibition of land disposal of
most untreated wastes. 9 They also promote steps by manufacturers
to minimize the generation of hazardous waste by industrial pro-
cesses. 10 In 1986, Congress increased funding for the "Superfund"
waste site clean-up program five-fold, to a targeted level of $8.5
billion for the period 1986-90.11 Two years later, in keeping with the
new emphasis on treatment of currently generated waste, Congress
redirected waste site cleanup from the practice of simple removal to
5 The Congressional Budget Office and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency each
estimated in the early 1980s that at least two thirds of hazardous waste was disposed of on
land. STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 165.
6 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6991 (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988).
7 42 U.S.C. §5 9601-9675 (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988).
8 The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991(i) (West Supp. 1988)).
9 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)-(g) (Supp. IV 1986) (land disposal prohibition); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)
(Supp. IV 1986) (no prohibition for treated wastes). The Environmental Protection Agency
has begun to implement provisions through regulation. E.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 30,908 (1988) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 148); id. 31,138 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 264, 265, 266,
268 and 271).
10 C. HARRIS, W. WANT & M. WARD, HAzARDOuS WASTE: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE
162-66 (1987) (describing section 224 of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984).
" Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, § 111(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (amending CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1982)).
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a more secure landfill toward a clear preference for permanent treat-
ment or destruction of the waste material. 12
Many states have been equally aggressive about trying to dis-
courage simple waste disposal.' 3 Some states have even attempted
to restrict the flow of hazardous waste into their territory. 14 Local
governments have often adopted similar restrictions 15 spurred on by
increasingly vociferous citizens who unabashedly embrace the "not-
in-my-back-yard," or NIMBY, philosophy.16
More demanding federal regulation, universal local opposition to
waste treatment and disposal facilities, and increased long-term li-
abilities for waste sites have substantially restricted the supply of
licensed waste handlers 17 and have sharply increased the costs of
waste disposal.' 8 As a result of increased costs and downstream
liabilities for cleanup, industrial generators have begun to examine
more closely their waste management practices and opportunities
12 SARA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
13 E.g., California Hazardous Waste Control Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-
25250 (West 1984 &,Supp. 1989); New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.1E-1 to -135 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988).
14 Efforts to ban all importation of out-of-state hazardous waste have fallen under commerce
clause challenges. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). Strict state
regulations and taxation of waste generation and disposal, however, have generally survived
challenges based on the supremacy clause or on federal preemption grounds. See, e.g., Exxon
Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526, 543-44, 481 A.2d 271, 280-81 (1984); see also CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 31303-31304 (West Supp. 1989). But see Rollins Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Parish of St. James,
775 F.2d 627, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1985).
15 See, e.g., ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE § 11-408(g)-(i) (1979); see also Browning-
Ferris Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1981) (upheld
certain features of the county ordinance to control hazardous waste through transport and
disposal requirements).
16 Lester, EPA Says: Build a New Superfund Site or Lose Money to Cleanup the Ones
You've Got, 6 EVERYONE'S BACK YARD (Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste) Spring
1988, at 8. The very title of this publication from a citizens grass roots organization alludes
positively to the NIMBY--"Not In My Back Yard"--philosophy. For a discussion of the
NIMBY syndrome, see Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive
Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 437 (1988).
17 "In the United States, the number of active, land-based hazardous waste sites has dropped
by two-thirds over the last [1986-87] year because of failure to meet deadlines for complying
with operating requirements. The nation's 13 commercial incinerators are operating at 90
percent of capacity; local opposition makes siting new facilities extremely difficult." S. POSTEL,
DEFUSING THE Toxics THREAT: CONTROLLING PESTICIDES AND INDUSTRIAL WASTE 40-41
(Worldwatch Institute, Paper No. 79, 1987).
18 "As demand outpaces supply and as tighter regulations are placed on disposal technolo-
gies, waste management costs are rising rapidly. Landfill prices have skyrocketed to $240 per
ton, a 16-fold increase since the early [1970s]. Incineration of organics now costs between $500
and $1,200 per ton. Waste management costs for DuPont, the nation's largest chemical
producer, now exceed $100 million annually." Id. at 41.
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they may have to reduce the amount of hazardous waste they gen-
erate. 19
Waste comprises all non-product hazardous outputs from an in-
dustrial operation into all environmental media, even though such
outputs may be within permitted or licensed limits. 20 Waste reduc-
tion focuses on "in-plant practices that reduce, avoid, or eliminate
the generation of hazardous waste so as to reduce risks to health
and the environment. '21 The strategies available for reducing waste
include using different raw materials in production, modifying pro-
duction technology, operations, and procedures, recycling waste
within plants, and redesigning end-products.2
Although market forces have begun to modify industrial behavior,
many policy analysts find the pace of improvements in waste treat-
ment and waste reduction unacceptably slow. Looking ahead to the
next decade, they point out the ultimate futility of treating waste
disposal as a single issue of land use or water pollution, and recom-
mend that the private and public sectors alike move toward an
integrated approach to waste management and waste minimization.2
Politicians, industrialists, academicians, and ordinary citizens share
the perception that hazardous waste is a pressing national problem
and urge that it be solved.Y
Reduction of waste at the source has gained special attention as a
promising adjunct to the statutory policies for proper disposal and
cleanup of old wastes. The congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment has prepared two studies on waste reduction. One of these
19 Strelow & Claussen, Liability Management in Practice: Waste Generators, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 943 (1988).
0 U.S, CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ITE-317, SERIOUS REDUC-
TION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 3
(1986) [hereinafter SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE].
21 1d
2 The Office of Technology Assessment cites immediate pratical measures such as mechan-
ical polishing of metals rather than polishing with solvents, and substituting water-based
solutions for those that use hydrocarbon-based solvents. Id. at 4.
23 THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT
MID DECADE 11-12, 319-21 (1984). See also SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE,
supra note 20, at 5.
? See, e.g., STEERING COMMITrEE ON HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, THE CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION CLEAN SITES AND PRIVATE ACTION: A PLAN TO ACCELERATE PRIVATE HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP 7-10 (1984) (the Steering Committee included industrial leaders,
heads of citizen environmental organizations, and two former public officials); Biden, A New
Direction for Environmental Policy: Hazardous Waste Prevention, Not Disposal, 17 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10400 (1987); C. HARRIS, W. WANT & M. WARD, supra note 10, at
8-15.
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studies espouses the concept of source reduction;? the other pro-
poses government research, support, and regulation to promote it. 2 6
Academic researchers have studied the European approach to waste
management, and have found many of their legal and technological
waste reduction strategies applicable in the American context.27 The
studies conclude that government regulation and public financial
support have their role in waste reduction, but private industry
inevitably bears primary responsibility for product and process
changes to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste.
The urgent need to marshall the full range of industrial strategies
to achieve significant reduction in the amount and toxicity of haz-
ardous waste and the environmentally sound treatment of residual
wastes suggests the need to investigate whether the economic in-
centives embodied in the tax code harmonize with the national haz-
ardous waste management policy or set up dissonances with the
policy that discourage private cooperation.2 This Article probes the
extent to which federal taxes, as reflected in the Internal Revenue
Code of 198629 (the Code) and elsewhere, are compatible or incom-
patible with federal environmental policies with respect to hazardous
wastes.30
After a brief discussion in Part II of the lack of specific environ-
mental policy input into the drafting of tax legislation, this Article
proceeds in Part III to the analysis of the Code provisions affecting
firms' management of wastes and their associated risks. This analysis
is organized according to the general character of the industrial
2 See SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 20.
6U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ITE-347, FROM POLLUTION
TO PREVENTION: A PROGRESS REPORT ON WASTE REDUCTION-SPECIAL REPORT (1987); see
also Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-based Incentives: Financial Responsi-
bility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986).
2 B. PIASECKI & G. DAVIS, AMERICA'S FUTURE IN ToXIc WASTE MANAGEMENT: LESSONS
FROM EUROPE (1987).
2 This Article should not be taken to suggest that tax policy should be used affirmatively
to promote non-revenue goals. We take no position here on that controversial question. Even
viewing the tax code as exclusively a revenue policy statement, however, it remains relevant
to inquire whether the code works at cross purposes to other social policies, and to suggest
changes that would make the code at least "policy neutral."
226 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section references are to the 1986 Internal
Revenue Code unless otherwise indicated.
3The domestic focus avoids many difficult issues that would greatly complicate the analysis.
For example, it may be timely to suggest that tax benefits should be withdrawn for imports
that entail damage to the entire planet, such as products that release chlorofluorocarbons that
deplete the vital ozone layer. Additional tax issues arise with respect to export activities that
may affect the environment of other countries. These questions deserve research and analysis,
but are simply beyond the scope of this Article.
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activity affected. Section A deals with the general policy underlying
tax deductions. Section B deals with the specifics of industrial op-
erations, including the tax treatment of raw materials, or feedstocks,
that are introduced into the production process and tax incentives
related to changes in industrial processes and new production tech-
nologies. Section C discusses the tax treatment of waste disposal,
including both pollution control equipment to treat waste before
release to the environment, as well as ultimate waste disposal. Fi-
nally, section D considers tax effects on the expenses and insurance
or capital accumulations to cover liabilities that may accrue to firms
after disposal of waste.
II. TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
In spite of the heightened awareness of environmental issues and
Congress's detailed legislation in the past twenty years on a vast
range of environmental issues, the legislative process for writing tax
law31 still has no systematic environmental input. The Constitution
calls for tax legislation to begin in the House of Representatives
and, implicitly, to move to the Senate and to the Executive for
approval or veto. 32 In fact, such legislation commonly originates in
the Executive Branch, goes to both houses of Congress, and invar-
iably goes into a House-Senate conference before being revoted by
the House and Senate. Hearings may or may not be called.
An army of experts interacts with any tax legislation. The Ad-
ministration has its own experts, particularly in the Office of Tax
Legislative Counsel3 and the Congress has expert staffs at the
House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee
levels. In addition, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
operates continuously regardless of legislative activity in the year.3 4
Yet nowhere in the system does a particular official, committee, or
other entity have the assignment to evaluate tax legislation from an
environmental perspective.
The ad hoc nature of the relationship between federal tax legis-
lation and environmental concerns suggests the need to subject the
environmental impact of tax legislation to mandatory thoughtful
evaluation and comments. Two avenues to implement such a change
31 See generally Surrey, The Federal Tax Legislative Process, 31 REc. A.B. CITY OF NEW
YORK 515 (1976); Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58
VA. L. REV. 1389 (1972).
-1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
"A segment of the Treasury Departrwent.
-4 See Washington Report: The Joint Committee on Taxation, 11 TAx ADVISOR 181 (1980).
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exist in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).35 One av-
enue is the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the office of
the President.36 CEQ should advise the President and Secretary of
the Treasury on environmental effects of the tax code. The other
avenue is NEPA's requirement for an environmental impact state-
ment on all proposals for legislative action, 37 a requirement that
observers have called NEPA's "neglected mandate."' s
In both cases, however, the environmental impact assessment
mandate applies to the Executive Branch only,39 and would not affect
the congressional end of the legislative process. Congress has sub-
stantial expertise available on environmental affairs. To bring this
expertise to bear on the analysis of tax legislation, however, would
require rules changes and perhaps increased staff. Because most tax
legislation actually originates in the Executive Branch, a strict ap-
plication of NEPA therefore appears to be the more effective ap-
proach.
III. TAx CODE TREATMENT OF Toxic WASTES
A. Public Policy Limitation on Deductions
1. The Limitation in General
All tax deductions were once subject to the so-called "public policy
limitation," the gist of which was to disallow a deduction in any
instance in which allowing the deduction would frustrate a sharply
defined governmental policy.40 That limitation remains embedded in
the Code. Thus, for example, deductions for casualty losses, 41 losses
from extraordinary obsolescence, 42 and depreciation43 continue to be
-1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
Id. § 4342.
', Id. § 4332(2)(C).
3s F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAw
AND POLICY 718 (1984). The tax legislative process has two separate phases. One entails
drafting changes in tax law, both to improve the tax code and to raise appropriate levels of
revenue. The second entails appropriating funds. In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347
(1979), the Supreme Court held that NEPA does not apply to appropriations legislation.
Because the tax law writing process necessitates amendments to the United States Code,
however, it is inherently substantive in nature and therefore warrants environmental impact
analysis under NEPA.
"42 U.S.C. § 4332(2).
40 See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
41 I.R.C. § 165 (1986).
42 Id.
4 Id. §§ 167-168.
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affected by this limitation. The major exception to the public policy
limitation is the narrower limitation on trade or business expense
deductions (section 162) and investment-related expense deductions
(section 212). For these types of expenses, sections 162 and 212
provide an exclusive short list of circumstances that bar deductions
on public policy grounds, namely, certain payments for legislative
activities, illegal bribes and kickbacks, treble damages payments
under the anti-trust laws, and fines and penalties.44 Sections 162 and
212 are otherwise free of moralizing.
Section 162 is the workhorse of the Code. It permits deductions
for wages, salaries, rents, and the day-to-day costs of running a
business. 45 The very breadth of section 162 greatly narrows the
public policy limitations on business expense deductions because it
makes most business deductions legitimate. Still, some residual en-
vironmental issues might be the subject of later tax controversies
not involving section 162. For example, the public policy limitation
should apply to claims for depreciation (otherwise deductible under
sections 167 or 168) of conduit or pipe used to direct unpermitted
discharge of toxic wastes into a river, or to disallow deductions for
losses resulting from the unlawful abandonment of dump sites laden
with hazardous materials. The fact that some depreciation expenses
may violate public policy appears to have eluded the detection of the
commentators. Given the paucity of administrative or judicial guid-
ance, taxpayers cannot be expected to impose the public policy lim-
itation on themselves in preparing their tax returns.
This observation has important implications for waste policy. If
taxpayers are not barred from claiming deductions for environmen-
tally destructive business behavior, it amounts to a Code subsidy for
facially illegitimate behavior. A student of the tax laws will not be
surprised; the purpose of the Code is to raise revenue, subject only
to a few broad theoretical constraints, one of which is that busi-
nesses, good or evil, should be taxed on their net incomes. 46 Because
ill-gotten gains are taxed, the costs of producing such gains are
generally deductible provided they are "ordinary and necessary," a
term used in sections 162 and 212.
"Necessary" means appropriate and helpful to earning money. 47
Virtually any business-related expenditure qualifies under this stan-
41 Id. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1988).
45 I.R.C. § 162(a).
46 See B. BITTKER & M. McMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
2.1 (1988).
47 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
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dard.48 "Ordinary" is generally interpreted to mean "not capital in
nature," that is, short-term in nature, 49 although there is also modest
authority for the proposition that ordinary means "not strange. '50
The notion that ordinary means "not strange" is sometimes used
to strike down deductions that for some reason or other offend a
court.51 A court might dredge it up to deny a section 162 deduction
on sufficiently egregious facts, for instance, to deny deductions for
the costs of unlawfully carting off and dumping toxic wastes. There
is apparently no decision on point with respect to environmental
issues, so this occasional interpretation of "ordinary" has been of no
value in the campaign to diminish the attractions of engaging in
environmentally unsound actions. Because of its rare use in only
extreme cases, it seems destined to remain a weak weapon.
The amorality of the Code should not be exaggerated. In numerous
particular instances, the Code denies business deductions for nor-
mative reasons to foster policies of less than overwhelming concern.
For example, net wagering losses are disallowed even though the
taxpayer might be a professional gambler.52 Similarly, losses on the
disposition of certain unregistered securities are barred53 and the
costs of broadcasting ads into the United States are nondeductible
if transmitted from a country with a corresponding rule.M The Code
subjects producers and disposers of hazardous wastes to no such
limitations, however. While it is not surprising to find that section
162 has not been applied to deny deductions for environmentally
unsound behavior, the failure to do so is puzzling when less signifi-
cant norms have already upset the generalization that any short-
lived cost of generating taxable income is currently deductible.
Even though Congress has failed to harness the Code to discour-
age environmentally unsound business practices, it is possible that
the courts could use the existing Code to disallow deductions for
environmentally destructive expenditures. To do so, however, judi-
cial interpretation of section 162 of the Code would have to be
conspicuously "stretched." At present, the Code effectively encour-
ages unsound practices. Similarly, other less significant Code sec-
tions (most notably that for losses) 55 could be, but have not been,
48 See 1 B.BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS, 201.1 (1981).
49 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
5 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933).
" See, e.g., Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984).
- I.R.C. § 165(d) (1986). But see Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987) (min-
imum tax).
I.R.C. § 165() (1986).
'
4 Id. § 162().
55 Id. § 165.
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interpreted to prevent deductions for environmentally undesirable
behavior.
2. The Deductibility of Punitive Damages
The Code does not prohibit the deduction of punitive damages,
except for treble damages under the anti-trust laws. 56 In other
words, section 162 does not bar a deduction for paying punitive
damages for egregious behavior in connection with environmental
malfeasance. Allowing tax deductions when punitive damages are
assessed for environmental misconduct leading to personal injuries,
however, represents questionable policy. While it does not positively
encourage bad acts, the deduction certainly mitigates the sting of
judicial sanctions for acts such as negligent spills of dioxin-tainted
wastes. Even if judges and juries take deductions into account when
fixing the amount of damages, 57 they will be unaware of the partic-
ular judgment-creditor's tax burden, making any judicial tax ac-
counting haphazard.
The question of punitive damages for environmental malfeasance
has raised considerable controversy. 58 The Code should prohibit de-
ductibility for several reasons. If not deductible, the financial burden
of the liability will be uniform, regardless of the payor's tax posture.
In addition, withdrawing the deduction will operate as an unqualified
disincentive for all taxpayers. Finally, legislative policy and judicial
action seem to regard environmental malfeasance as more socially
reprehensible than anti-trust conspiracies. 59 Consequently, section
162(g) should be expanded to disallow deduction for punitive dam-
ages for such behavior.
3. Illegal Payments
Illegal bribes and kickbacks are nondeductible. 60 Prohibiting de-
ductions for such expenses covers specific circumstances in environ-
56 Id. § 162(g).
57 Empirical evidence on this question appears to be lacking.
" See 2 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 26-27 (June 3, 1987). Most such awards have come in cases
brought on a products liability theory. Proposed federal legislation, H.R. 1115, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1987), would make it more difficult for courts to impose such damages. Id.
9 See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 584 (June 12, 1987). At a time when antitrust enforcement is
declining, environmental enforcement, including criminal prosecution, is increasing in response
to public attitudes. Id.
- I.R.C. § 162(c)(1) (1986).
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mental affairs such as bribes paid to an environmental agency in-
vestigator. 61
A broader provision, section 162(c)(2), denies trade or business
deductions for "other illegal payments," meaning payments to any
person if it is a bribe, kickback, or other illegal payment under any
federal law or any state law, provided the state law is generally
enforced and subjects the payor to criminal penalty or loss of license
to engage in a trade or business, whether or not imposed on the
taxpayer.62 The key question under section 162(c)(2) is what the term
"illegal payment" means. The regulations 63 provide no practical guid-
ance, and there seems to be no other interpretive authority.
64
Section 162(c)(2) will not likely carry much weight with respect to
environmental issues. The cases arising under it concentrate on
payments that in and of themselves violate the law, such as "payola"
6 5
and payments that fall below legal minimums. 66 Given the broad
wording of the statute, one might expect a broader application of
"other illegal payment" to sweep in payments that arise in connection
with an illegal act. Unfortunately, interpretations of the provision
do not support such an application.
The weakness of the provision is clear. It covers only payments
that are in themselves proscribed, rather than payments arising in
connection with illegal acts. Thus, if a manufacturer pays a trucking
company to haul hazardous waste illegally, section 162(c)(2) cannot
apply because the typical statute is geared toward the immediate
act (dumping wastes), not the payment of money to induce bad acts.
To solve this oversight, Congress could easily expand section
162(c)(2) to cover payment in consideration for illegal acts.
B. Tax Treatment of Raw Materials and Feedstocks
1. Percentage Depletion
Although the terms "toxic substances" and "hazardous waste"
conjure up thoughts of synthetic chemicals, many of the most heavily
used and most toxic substances are naturally occurring minerals,
61 Id.
2 Id. § 162(c)(2). Again, the burden of proof is on the IRS. Id.
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18 (1988).
64 The debate so far has concentrated on whether price rebates or kickbacks shown as
increased costs of goods sold are to be disallowed as illegal payments. See Max Sobel Wholesale
Liquors v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Rev. Rul. 82-149, 1982-2 C.B. 56.
65 Coed Records, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 422 (1967) (prior law).
66 Atzinger-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 173 (1961).
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such as asbestos, that have been put to commercial or industrial use.
Moreover, the synthetic chemicals themselves are derivatives of
natural materials, especially petroleum. Because mineral extraction
and petroleum production are the root of most hazardous wastes,
the percentage depletion allowance for investments in natural
resources 67 relates directly to waste reduction policy.
The percentage depletion allowance alters the preference between
extraction and use of virgin materials as compared to the recycling
of used materials. Because the extraction, refining, and processing
of virgin materials typically generates greater amounts of waste
materials than recycling of used materials, the percentage depletion
allowance again becomes relevant to waste management and reduc-
tion.
The percentage depletion allowance emerges from an elaborate
network of rules relating to the depletion of natural resources. De-
spite the complexities, the system reduces to two fundamental sys-
tems of depletion, namely cost depletion and percentage depletion.
Cost depletion 6 is designed to recover the taxpayer's interest in
an exhaustible natural resource at the rate at which it is being
extracted. There are virtually no distinctions among the types of
resources being exploited. The depletion of timber is complicated,
but only by the obvious fact that trees propagate and grow. Because
of such growth, the taxpayer's depletable investment in each unit of
standing timber tends to diminish with the passage of time. Aside
from timber, however, the cost depletion system is essentially
straightforward and has engendered little audit controversy or leg-
islative concern.
By contrast, percentage depletion tends to be exasperatingly com-
plex because of Congress's obvious ambivalence toward the system. 69
Percentage depletion simply means a deduction based on a percent-
age of the sale price. The sales may bar actual sales or constructive
sales. Vertically integrated resource companies use constructive
sales prices, as when a copper company mines the ore, processes it,
and makes a final product like copper wire.70
For example, domestic oil and gas extracted and sold by a so-
called independent producer is depletable at a rate of fifteen per-
67 I.R.C. § 611-613A.
6 Id. §§ 611-612. To illustrate cost depletion, if a taxpayer paid $10,000 for a mine containing
100,000 tons of coal, the taxpayer could claim a ten cent deduction ($10,000 divided by 100,000)
for each ton of coal extracted and sold. See id.
Compare, e.g., id. §§ 611-613 with id. §§ 57(a)(1), 291(a)(2), 613A, 613(b).
- Id. § 613, 613A.
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cent. 71 To illustrate, assume a small oil and gas producer pays $10,000
for an estate that turns out to contain 10,000 barrels of oil. In the
first year, the producer sells 1000 barrels at $10 per barrel. She can
claim a deduction of $1500 (.15 x $10 x 1000). In the second year,
she also sells 1000 barrels, but the price jumps to $20 per barrel.
For the second year, the percentage depletion deduction rises to
$3000.
The key controversy about percentage depletion is that it is un-
related to the taxpayer's investment in her interest in the resource.
If the taxpayer in the example had invested only $1.00 in the entire
history of the natural resource property, she could still claim a $3,000
deduction for the second year. By contrast, the cost depletion system
would allow the oil and gas operator only a $1.00 depletion deduction
over the life of the well for a $1.00 capital investment. Taxpayers
must elect cost or percentage depletion on a property-by-property
basis, depending on which procedure yields the greater tax deduction
for the particular year.72
Congress has gradually pared back the percentage depletion sys-
tem over the years in ways that need not be addressed here in detail,
especially with respect to the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless,
the fundamental potential windfall of being able to claim a deduction
for exhausting natural resources in excess of one's investment in the
resource remains.
From an environmental perspective, the deduction yields some
truly perverse results because of the way the Code distributes the
"windfall." In the case of hard-rock minerals in particular, different
minerals qualify for deduction at dramatically different rates. The
higher the rate, the better the taxpayer's vantage.
The average percentage depletion rate is 12.1 percent.73 The high-
est rate, twenty-two percent, is granted to asbestos, uranium, lead,
and mercury! Each of these minerals is notorious for its capacity to
damage the human body, the environment, or both.74 Moreover, EPA
has taken specific steps to reduce the use of these substances and
limit human exposure. 75 No legislative history underlies this curious
71 Id. § 613A.
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.169-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1972).
73 Based on averaging the seven different rates set forth in I.R.C. § 613(b)(1).
74 Ford, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos Related Diseases? Manville's Chap-
ter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENVTL. L. 465, 466-68 (1984); EPA Sets Standards for Radiation
from Active Uranium Mills, TRIAL, Dec. 1983, at 13-14; Lead: Assessing Its Health Hazards,
2 HEALTH & ENvTL. DIG. 1 (1988); N. HUDDLE & M. REICH, ISLAND OF DREAMS: ENVIRON-
MENTAL CRISIS IN JAPAN 102-32 (1975) (telling the story of mercury poisoning in Minamata).
75 All the minerals except lead are designated as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean
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favoritism for such harmful materials in our tax laws. One can fairly
ask whether these substances should not be reduced to the lowest
rate or denied the percentage depletion deduction altogether, as in
the cases of integrated oil and gas producers and transferees of
proven oil and gas properties.7 6
By disproportionately encouraging the extraction of minerals with
known significant toxic characteristics, present tax laws clash with
sound environmental policies. The preferential treatment of these
minerals deserves review on the reasonable expectation that they
would be mined less eagerly in favor of less destructive alternatives
if their percentage depletion rates were reduced or eliminated. In
addition, serious consideration should be given to determining how
to balance appropriately the extraction of virgin resources as op-
posed to recycling used resources. The present structure of the Code
does nothing to encourage recycling. 77
2. Feedstock Taxes and Superfund
This section gives a thumbnail sketch of the complex set of taxes
on forty-nine chemical and petroleum products that provides the
major revenue source of the Superfund to clean up old and abandoned
hazardous waste sites.7 8 Congress selected these petroleum and
chemical substances as the original source materials, or feedstocks,
for most processes and products that generate hazardous waste. The
taxes, found in sections 4611, 4661, and, after 1986, 4671 of the Code,
were designed to raise $1.38 billion for the fiscal period 1980-85.
The amount was to be supplemented by $220 million from general
revenues, for a total fund of $1.6 billion.79 Actual revenues were only
$863 million by the end of 1984 because of declining production of
the taxed feedstocks8 0 Meanwhile, the estimates of costs to clean
up hazardous waste sites continued to climb. By 1985, the General
Air Act, meaning that EPA has concluded that they are expected to increase mortality, serious
irreversible illness, or incapacitating reversible illness. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1); 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.01(a). Lead is regulated as an ambient air pollutant, again based on health effects.
- I.R.C. § 613A(a), (c)(9) (1986).
7 The Office of Technology Assessment is considering this issue. The results should be
interesting.
7 Superfund is a creation of Title II of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982) as amended by
SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV 1986), codified in various sections of the Internal Revenue
Code. The expenditure of the Superfund monies is limited to hazardous waste response under
§ 111 of CERCLA. I.R.C. § 9507(c) (1986).
7 H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 317-18, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3410-11.
80 Viard, Tax Issues Raised by Superfund Reauthorization, 28 TAX NOTES 1026, 1026 (1985).
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Accounting Office estimated total costs to be in the range of $39
billion but possibly as high as $100 billion.8' In response, Congress
in 1986 increased the five-year revenue goal to $8.5 billion. 2
The concept behind the feedstock taxes is to force the industries
that presumably benefited in the past from the cheap and inadequate
waste disposal practices that created the waste sites to shoulder the
current cost of cleaning up those wastes. Unfortunately, the rela-
tionship between the particular tax and the environmental exter-
nalities from the particular material is acknowledged to be crude. 3
Although the debate in the mid-1980s on reauthorization of Super-
fund included discussion about this relationship, Congress only con-
sidered, but ultimately did not adopt, a direct tax on the hazardous
wastes themselves s4
C. Tax Treatment of Waste Treatment and Disposal
In two specific instances, Congress has modified the Code to adapt
to environmental concerns. One involves the rapid amortization of
certain pollution control facilities.85 The other involves tax-exempt
81 Id.
2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, SUPERFUND DESKBOOK 51 (1986). The shares of
expected revenue from various sources break down as follows (in billions of dollars):
Petroleum tax $2.759
Feedstock chemicals tax $1.365
Imported chemicals tax $0.057
Environmental (general
industry) tax $2.522
General revenues $1.250
Superfund originally taxed crude oil at 0.79 cents per barrel. CERCLA, 26 U.S.C. § 4611
(1982). The 1986 amendments increased this tax to 8.2 cents per barrel for domestic crude,
and 11.7 cents for imported crude. I.R.C. § 4611(c). Twelve primary petrochemicals and thirty
inorganic chemicals are taxed at rates varying between twenty-two cents per ton for potassium
hydroxide and $10.13 per ton for xylene. Id. § 4661(b).
8 Viard, supra note 80, at 1028.
84 Id. at 1029. Whatever their benefits from an economic incentive viewpoint, waste-end
taxes tend to be an uncertain source of revenue because taxpayers will seek ways to reduce
the amount of hazardous waste they generate. This may be environmentally constructive, but
the revenue deterioration is not appropriate for a major tax designed to raise billions of
dollars. There is also substantial concern that some firms will evade a waste-end tax by
surreptitious disposal of wastes-so-called midnight dumping.
Congress heard proposals for other sources of revenue, including a much larger share for
general revenues and a broad-based tax on industrial generators of hazardous waste. Although
a broad-based tax on waste generators was not adopted, about one-quarter of the revenues
for the five-year period 1986-90 will come from a new "environmental tax" related to corporate
income taxes. See supra note 82.
1z I.R.C. § 169.
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financing of waste treatment facilities."6 The former topic is fairly
controversial. The latter has attracted little attention.
1. Amortization of Pollution Control Facilities
Section 169 of the Code allows certified pollution control facilities
to be amortized over a period of sixty months, beginning with the
month following acquisition or completion, or with the next taxable
year. The provision is elective, and is designed to induce private
industry to commit funds for anti-pollution facilities that "generally
do not result in any increase in the profitability of a plant."87
In order to qualify for this rapid write-off, the facility has to be
certified by federal and state authorities as conforming with pre-
scribed standards for the prevention, abatement, or control of air or
water pollution. 8 The facility must not significantly change the out-
put capacity or useful life of the taxpayers plant, nor may it reduce
the plant's operating costs.8 9 The facility's costs must also not be
repaid by the recovery of wastes,90 and, if the facility has a useful
life of over fifteen years, the portion of the investment that can be
written off under section 169 is reduced proportionately.91
For example, if the facility's useful life were thirty years, one-half
of its cost could be written off in five years (sixty months) and the
rest could be written off over the normal useful life. The election to
amortize the improvement over a sixty-month period is terminable
at will. 92 Section 169 does not apply if the facility might otherwise
have been installed, even though it is certified as useful for combat-
ting pollution and does not add significant value to the plant.93
What Congress gave in section 169 it has partly taken back in
various ways. Specifically, section 291(a)(5) provides that, in the case
of a corporation, the amortizable basis of pollution control facilities
under section 169 must be reduced by twenty percent, say from $1
I.R.C. § 103, 142(a)(5), (6), (10).
87 S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 580. See McDaniel
& Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air and Water Pollution:
A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 12 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REV. 351 (1971); Reese, The
Tax Implications of Pollution Control Investments After ERTA and TEFRA, 31 OIL & GAS
TAx Q. 338, 376 (1982).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.169-2(a) (as amended in 1970).
89 I.R.C. § 169(d)(1)(c) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.169-2(b)(2)(ii), 2(d).
90 I.R.C. § 169(e) (1986). That is, if the facility recovers a useful material (for example,
silver from photographic coating wastes), the value of the recovered material cannot equal or
exceed the annualized cost of the facility itself.
91 Id. § 169(f)(2).
92 Id. § 169(c).
3 See Treas. Reg. § 1.169-2(d).
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million to $800,000. Section 291(c)(1) in turn, however, subjects that
twenty percent to depreciation under section 168. This juxtaposition
evidences a surprising ambivalence on the part of Congress, and
adds a nuisance to already elaborate bookkeeping requirements. In
general, Congress designed section 291 to limit certain exceptional
tax benefit claims by corporations. This populist limitation merely
invites taxpayers to change the form in which business is conducted,
which is clearly an undesirable outcome. 94
In addition, the alternative minimum tax9 5 applies to the acceler-
ated amortization of such pollution control facilities. The base on
which the tax falls, if at all, is the amount actually claimed under
section 169 minus the significantly smaller amount that the taxpayer
would have been entitled to had he or she written off the asset under
section 168(g).9 6 That tax applies at a twenty-one percent rate for
individuals and twenty percent for corporations.9 7
On one hand, section 169 provides a healthy incentive to install
facilities that will not have commercial value because five-year amor-
tization is rapid compared to the usual seven to twenty-seven and a
half year depreciation system that would otherwise apply.98 On the
other hand, a well-sheltered taxpayer might find the possibility of
an alternative minimum tax an undue burden. In addition, it is not
clear that section 169 is available if one party leases it to another.99
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or Congress should clarify this
last question.
Section 169 is subject to criticism on several grounds: it merely
softens the blow of doing what regulators require anyway, but does
not help taxpayers running tax losses; it only reaches some pollution;
and, it fails to encourage use of less polluting fuels. The most serious
criticism of section 169 is its denial in cases where it can add value
or profit.100 Congress premised that denial on the existence of the
now repealed investment tax credit (ITC), which made section 169
inferior to the combination of cost recovery under section 168 plus
the former ITC.10
For example, using a partnership consisting of individuals acting as lessors to avoid
I.R.C. § 291(c).
95 I.R.C. § 55 (1986).
- Id. § 56(a)(5).
- Id. § 55(b)(1).
9 See id. § 168(e).
99 Reese, supra note 87, at 376-77.
'0 Millett, Pollution and The Federal Revenue Code, 8 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 535, 549
(1972).
101 See generally Reese, supra note 87; Moore & Streuling, Pollution Control Devices:
Rapid Amortization Versus the Investment Credit, 52 TAXES 25 (1974).
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Since passage of the 1986 Code, pollution control facilities have
generally been favored under section 169 because recovery periods'0 2
are substantially longer for virtually all classes of tangible prop-
erty,10 3 making sixty-month amortization all the more appealing. For
example, much public utility property such as coal-fired power
plants, moved from being fifteen-year property'0 4 to being twenty-
year property. 10 5 Also, Congress eliminated the ITC, thereby reduc-
ing the prior ten percent subsidy for acquiring industrial hardware,
and further widening the disparity between pollution control equip-
ment and other hardware. 10 6
An increasingly important restraint on section 169 arises from
Congress's decision to apply it only to plants that were in operation
before January 1, 1976. Because of this cutoff, the growing popula-
tion of new plants that have come onstream after 1975 gains no
benefit from section 169. As a result, section 169 fails to create an
incentive to build new plants that cost more but provide better
control of toxic wastes for that increased cost. 0 7
Commentators have criticized the provision for its oversimplified
view of the competitive advantages involved. 0 Pollution control
agencies already account for the extra expense of retrofitting equip-
ment in old plants, relative to comparable equipment in new plants,
when they set pollution control standards, allow construction per-
mits, and determine who will have enforcement actions brought
against them. 09 Even if an old plant must spend more money to
'2 See I.R.C. § 167 (1986).
'0 See id. § 168.
104 Id. § 168(c)(2)(E) (replaced in 1986).
10 Id. § 168(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11, class 49.14 (1980).
106 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
107 The January 1, 1976 cutoff was based on the Senate's view that the cost of upgrading
old facilities is greater than the cost of redesigning new ones. See Reese, supra note 87, at
362-74; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1969).
10S ee, e.g., Givelber & Schaffer, Section 169 of the Internal Revenue Code: An Income
Tax Subsidy for the Control of Pollution, 14 ARiz. L. REV. 65 (1972).
109 The Clean Water Act, for example, clearly states different technology criteria and cost-
consideration criteria for existing sources compared to new sources. Compare 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (1983 & West Supp. 1988) with 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316. For a general
discussion of technology and cost considerations in setting discharge limits under the Clean
Water Act, see W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.29 (1986). The
adage that old plants spend more money complying with such pollution laws than new plants
is true, however, only when comparing plants within the same industry. Section 169 cannot
differentiate between industries with high pollution control costs and competing industries
that may be able to comply more cheaply. For example, it would favor an old steel mill over
a new, less polluting, plastics plant even though both make parts for automobiles.
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control pollution than would a new plant, the government should
reduce the subsidy to the new plant proportionately instead of re-
fusing to subsidize it at all. To the extent these subsidies are intended
to alleviate the hardships that accrue to investors in old plants when
the legislature enacts tougher pollution control laws, such hardships
fall on more recent plants as well as much older ones. In addition,
section 169 has the inherent problem of propelling firms in the di-
rection of using end-of-pipe methods to control pollution from less
efficient facilities rather than making process changes to reduce raw
waste generation. The firm that changes fuels or modifies processes
of production to minimize pollution receives no special subsidy even
though such changes may be more efficient at reducing pollution
than buying new waste treatment equipment.
In addition to providing no incentive to build new plants with
better waste controls, section 169 is arguably overbroad in that the
EPA interprets it to include equipment permissively installed as
well as equipment required to meet legal standards." 0 While the
EPA view seems sound, it may be subject to abuse by the states.
Section 169(d)(2)(A) defines a certified pollution control facility as a
facility that a state certifying authority declares to be installed or
acquired consistent with that state's program for pollution control."'
It does not require states to have mandated the investment through
regulation or enforcement. Consequently, section 169(d)(2)(A) in-
vites states to encourage industrial relocation by having broad, per-
missive programs that allow maximum exploitation of section 169's
benefits.
Congress should explicitly amend the Code to conform to the EPA
view in order to encourage voluntary control of pollution beyond
legal minimums. The tax regulations will prevent taxpayer abuse of
the system, so the only danger to a broad allowance for permissively
installed pollution control may be a slight loss of revenue. Although
section 169 is not pegged to the extent of reduction of pollution, but
to capital invested, 1 2 the backstop of action consistent with govern-
ment programs should be enough.
Another objection to section 169 asserts that it is technically re-
gressive in that it gives a greater stimulus to taxpayers in higher
110 Compare Pollution Control Facilities: Guidelines for Certification, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,132
(1971) with H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1969).
" I.R.C. § 169(d)(2)(A).
112 Id. § 169(a).
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tax brackets, and fails altogether to stimulate non-taxpaying oper-
ators such as municipalities or companies with operating loss car-
ryovers." 3 Although these entities may desperately need financial
subsidies, the section gives them no help. Congress should consider
supplementing section 169 with a refundable credit or a direct sub-
sidy for financially needy owners and operators.1 4
Section 169 fails to get to the heart of the matter of reducing toxic
wastes. It encourages end-of-pipe equipment over process changes
and new materials, and it gives no help to the firms that need it
most: those running tax losses. It also creates no incentive for post-
1975 plants to operate more cleanly. Even if some states could use
section 169 to promote permissive investment in extra pollution
control with a federal subsidy, for most companies, section 169
merely subsidizes legally mandated pollution control investments.
Overall, section 169 typifies the haphazard federal approach toward
coordinating tax and environmental policies and highlights the need
for much more thoughtful and systematic integration of taxation with
environmental quality goals.
2. Tax-exempt Financing
Private activity bonds, such as corporate bonds, produce taxable
interest."5 Bonds issued to finance pollution control facilities in the
hands of private owners are, therefore, prima facie incapable of
producing tax-exempt interest. Section 141(d), however, exempts
such bonds if they are "qualified bonds. 11 6 Qualified bonds, in turn,
include "exempt facility bonds. 1" 7 Exempt facility bonds include
those for sewage and solid waste disposal facilities and hazardous
waste disposal facilities."l8 Except for the three types of facilities
just mentioned, an exempt facility must serve regularly for general
public use." 9
3 See I.R.C. § 172 (1986).
11 See generally Reed, Economic Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Applying Theory to
Practice, 12 ARiz. L. REv. 511 (1970) (preference for effluent charge system).
I's I.R.C. § 103(b) (1986).
116 Id. § 141(d).
117 Id. § 141(d)(1)(A).
Ill Id. § 142(a)(5), (6), (10). It should be noted that the 1986 Tax Reform Act substantially
rewrote the Code's provisions on tax exempt bonds. The provisions of interest to us here,
however, were modified only slightly, so regulations and precedents established under the
pre-1986 Code remain valid.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(2) (as amended in 1983).
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The Treasury regulations carefully and elaborately define facilities
that qualify for the exempt facility exemption. 120 The regulations
define sewage disposal facilities and solid waste disposal facilities as
property used for the collection, storage, treatment, utilization, pro-
cessing, or final disposal of sewage or solid waste. 121 Pursuant to
these regulations, a facility that recycles solid wastes can qualify as
a solid waste disposal facility if solid waste accounts for at least
sixty-five percent of the waste handled. '2 Even if this type of facility
"operates at a profit," it can still qualify if the solid waste it treats
or disposes is useless or unwanted material that has no market value
and that no one is willing to purchase.123
In addition to sewage and solid waste facilities, the regulations
define air and water pollution control facilities as serving the public
good and thus fulfilling the public use requisite.'2 A property is
considered an air or water pollution control facility if it is used wholly
or partly to abate pollution by removing, altering, disposing, or
storing the contaminant, and if the expenditure would not have been
made except for the purpose of pollution control.' To allow for
depreciation, the expenditure must also satisfy the requirements of
section 167, namely, that the property have a limited physical life
and be held for use in a trade or business or for the production of
income. 26 In addition, a federal, state, or local agency must certify
that the facility controls air or water pollution or that it meets
federal, state, and local standards to control air and water pollu-
tion. 12
It does not matter if the facility also engages in reprocessing the
waste, generation of energy, or other activities ancillary to waste
Id. § 1.103-8(f), (g).
Id. § 1.103-8(f)(2)(i), (ii).
Id. § 1.103-8(f)(2)(ii)(c).
n Id. § 1.103-8(f)(2)(ii)(b). Since this regulation was written, the definition of solid waste
has been amended and recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982). The amended definition of
solid waste is somewhat broader than the original definition.
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(g)(1) (as amended in 1983).
Id. § 1.103-8(g)(2)(i)(b), (ii), (ii).
Id. § 1.103-8(g)(2)(i)(a) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 167(a) (1982)).
Id. § 1.103-8(g)(2)(i)(a), (b). Expenditures for property are sufficient to fulfill the require-
ments of subdivisions (iii) and (iv) as long as the property will be used for the control of
pollution, even if it serves functions other than just the control of pollution. If, however, a
significant purpose other than the control of pollution will be served, only the expenditures
spent for pollution control will satisfy the test of this subdivision. A significant purpose is
defined as one that produces "an increase in production or capacity, or in the material extension
of the useful life of a manufacturing or production facility or part thereof." Id. § 1.103-
8(g)(2)(v).
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disposal. Under the temporary Treasury rules, however, the portion
of the cost of the solid waste disposal facility that is actually used in
the disposal process is allocable to solid waste disposal for section
141(d) purposes. 12
The foregoing regulations contain no surprises. They basically
allow a subsidy by removing a tax on income from capital for estab-
lishing two forms of waste removal facilities. This innocuous provi-
sion does not seem to merit much debate. Its effectiveness, however,
is questionable. Many waste removal facilities will probably be built
anyway, and the subsidy may not be sufficient to stimulate increased
construction of such facilities where they are needed. It should be
noted that the types of wastes contemplated by section 141(d) are
much more extensive than the toxic wastes that are the focus of this
Article, and include such items as household waste and discarded
newspapers.
D. Tax Treatment of Post-disposal Liabilities
The federal income tax implications of liabilities that arise after
disposal of toxic wastes have assumed major significance for both
revenue and environmental policies. Parties responsible for existing
waste site cleanup under Superfund face multi-billion dollar liabili-
ties, prompting increased attention of state governments, banks,
insurance companies, and real estate developers, as well as industrial
concerns, to the financial arrangements for potential waste-related
liabilities. Although the tax implications of such liabilities raise per-
haps the most important policy questions in this Article, analysis of
these questions must inevitably focus on specific tax accounting ques-
tions.
This section begins with a survey of tax accounting concepts, and
then moves to the implication of denying taxpayers deductions for
setting aside money to take care of liabilities they will face in the
future. As will be seen, the one bright spot for tax policy is the
special treatment of nuclear decommissioning costs. The final ele-
ments of this section concern the tax incentives for forming under-
capitalized subsidiaries to carry on environmentally risky activities
and the possibility of using casualty insurance as an alternative to
reserves for future liabilities.
'12 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 17.1(a) (1975).
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1. Background on Accrual Method Deductions and Reserves for
Future Expenses
The cost of cleanup and compensation for injuries attributed to
hazardous waste has generated more discussion and controversy in
the last ten years than the regulation of the wastes themselves. 129
In RCRA, 130 Congress foresaw the problem of contingent future
liabilities for current waste disposal practices, and enacted a require-
ment for bonding or insurance for liabilities and clean-up costs oc-
curring after the closure of a waste disposal site.13' By 1980, Con-
gress had become aware of problems throughout the country with
old, often abandoned, hazardous waste sites, and passed the Super-
fund law to marshal national resources to clean them up. 132
Superfund has had its most profound impact on the actions of
parties who are potentially responsible for clean-up costs at partic-
ular sites. 1' The potentially responsible parties, especially the in-
dustrial generators of toxic wastes, now seek strategies and legal
arrangements that will reduce, absolve, or shift their liability. In
many cases, however, such avoidance strategies are impossible or
impractical. The potentially responsible parties therefore also seek
ways to accumulate capital sufficient to cover hazardous waste lia-
bilities that they cannot avoid.
The fundamental issue that arises with respect to post-disposal
liability is whether and to what extent a taxpayer should be allowed
to claim a tax deduction for expenditures that will be paid out in
some future year.'3 The issue of deductibility of future expenses
relates primarily to taxpayers on the accrual method, the system
used by most major business taxpayers and manufacturers. 35
12 Futrell, Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances: Lessons from Superfund, RCRA, and
other Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REV. 125 (1987); see also Lucero, Responses to J.
William Futrell, 24 Hous. L. REV. 143, 148 (1987); Special Issue: Managing Liability from
Hazardous Waste, 25 Hous. L. REV. 715-977 (1988).
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
131 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6), (t)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), implemented by rules at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 264.140-264.151 (1987).
13 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9659 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
133 The law enumerates four classes of people legally liable for cleanup: current owners and
operators of the site; owners and operators at the time of waste disposal; generators of the
wastes at the site; and those who transported the wastes to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
Collectively, they are commonly known as the "potentially responsible parties."
134 The following materials deal with an arcane topic of tax accounting. Every attempt is
made to simplify the concepts, many of which may appear baffling to the uninitiated reader.
5 I.R.C. § 446(c)(2) (1982).
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Under the accrual method, a taxpayer reports income when all
the events fixing the right to payment have taken place (for example,
when an order of goods is shipped out) regardless of when actual
payment is due or received. 13 6 Likewise, a deduction is available
when all the events fixing the duty to make a payment in some
future year have taken place. 137 For example, if removing the ov-
erburden above a mineral deposit to be stripmined triggers a duty
to pay money in order to rehabilitate the land, a deduction may be
available when the overburden has been removed even though the
area may not be reclaimed until well in the future.'-'
Under the cash method of accounting, by contrast, taxpayers do
not report income until it is actually received, and they cannot claim
deductions until they are actually paid. To the extent that the pay-
ments produce values that last into future years, however, they must
be proportionately "capitalized" (suspended) and written off in such
future years. 139
The preceding summary of the accrual and cash methods describes
financial accounting 40 more accurately than it does tax accounting.
Over the years, tax accounting has generally drifted away from the
fairly pure world of financial accounting, usually in favor of the IRS
and against the accrual method taxpayer. In other words, the ten-
dency has been to put accrual method taxpayers onto the cash
method if doing so raises taxes.
The government has used three major tools to shift the balance in
its favor. First, section 446(b) of the Code authorizes the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue to impose his or her own method of
accounting on the taxpayer if the taxpayer's method is found to
distort income or to fail to reflect income accurately.' The Com-
missioner has used this weapon with great success to force prepaid
receipts to be taxed on receipt, thereby effectively putting accrual
method taxpayers on the cash method. 4 2 Second, the government
has applied the so-called claim-of-right doctrine to tax accrual
method taxpayers on income they have earned and exercise dominion
13 Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1934).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1988).
13 Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 1369 (1981).
19 See I.R.C. § 263 (1986).
140 The term refers to accounting practice applied by CPAs reporting the annual financial
results of enterprises, for the benefit of creditors and owners of the enterprise.
14 Such actions by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot be reversed unless they
constitute an abuse of discretion, which is a difficult standard for taxpayers to meet. See Lucas
v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930), rev'g 30 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1929).
14? See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs § 105.1.6 (1981).
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over, even though the earnings are forfeitable and hence not formally
accruable. 143 Third, the economic performance requirement embod-
ied in section 461(h) of the Code'44 denies deductions for future
disbursements until the taxpayer receives services, property, or use
of property for which the taxpayer has contracted. This triad of
forces has made tax commentators cynical about Congress's willing-
ness to distort coherent accounting principles in order to accelerate
the flow of revenue 145 and makes accrual method taxpayers under-
standably feisty about further incursions on their tax accounting
territory.
The tax treatment of general reserve accounting shows how Con-
gress has disrupted traditional accounting practices. General reserve
accounting is a method that accrual method taxpayers have tradi-
tionally used to establish reserves to cover future expenses. The
method is best described by example: 46
Mr. Scheussler sells home furnaces. The price of a furnace is
$550. In connection with selling a furnace, Mr. Scheussler prom-
ises to turn off the furnace in the spring and to clean and start
it each fall for five years. He estimates the cost of doing so at
$10 per year, that is, $50 over the five-year period. Accordingly,
in the year of the sale, he reports $550 of gross income on the
sale of each furnace, but offsets that figure by $50, his "reserve"
for future expenditures in connection with each furnace. Each
year in which he actually services the-furnace, he will add $10
to income, but will subtract the actual cost of servicing the
furnace ($10.50 in the first year, $7.50 in the second year, etc.).
As the example shows, the reserve method reflects his income
accurately in that it appropriately reduces what would otherwise be
inflated income ($550) in the first year by the anticipated future costs
of the contract. Accountants endorse the reserve method because of
its levelling effect, which creates a steadier pattern of income (or
loss) and better matches the timing of income and deductions. For
example, if Mr. Scheussler simply reported $550 in year one and a
$10 loss in years two through six, the outcome would be silly because
the transactional event is the sale of a furnace at a net gain of $500
(less its cost to him), not a large profit in one year and a series of
losses in succeeding years.
1 See North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
144 Effective in 1985 and later years.
145 See, e.g., Malman, Treatment of Prepaid Income-Clear Reflection of Income or Muddied
Waters, 37 TAx L. REV. 103 (1981); Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tax Treatment
of Future Costs, 40 TAx L. REV. 577 (1985).
16 See Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
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Although general reserve accounting is accurate, taxpayers can
manipulate the method by shrewdly creating liabilities that will not
call for payment until far in the future. 147 The introduction of section
461(h) in 1984 therefore eliminated the general use of reserves for
future expenses. As a result, the only way for an accrual method
taxpayer to deduct liabilities (whether or not denominated reserves)
for future expenditures is to undertake the activity that produces
the liability (in our example, clean and fire up the furnace) or take
advantage of some specific reserve accounting provision that ex-
pressly allows such a deduction despite the general restriction im-
posed by section 461(h). 4 8
2. Environmental Policy Implications of Lack of General Reserve
Accounting and the Economic Performance Limitation
The unavailability of general reserve accounting produces conflict-
ing considerations for the taxpayer. To illustrate the issues, a hy-
pothetical taxpayer may be useful. Assume that the taxpayer is an
incorporated junkyard that uses the accrual method. The company
is aware that its activities, such as piling up old batteries and allow-
ing associated toxins to accumulate, will almost surely result in
eventual contamination of the local groundwater, with consequent
state intervention, possible fines, and a need to clean up the toxic
wastes it has collected.
Case 1:
Taxpayers who are on the accrual method in theory qualify for a
deduction if they can show that their actions either have resulted in
a fixed liability to correct their malfeasance or have rendered the
payment schedule so clear that a current deduction is permissible. 4 9
The pure accrual method thus encourages the junkyard to solidify
its liability so that it can report the deduction immediately. Such an
incentive could induce the junkyard operator to engage in destruc-
147 See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1969)
(current deductibility of "bonds" due 20 years in the future successfully challenged under
§ 446(b) power).
148 Later in the Article, we discuss several such specific Code provisions that have special
significance from an enviromnental perspective. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying
text.
149 This is the result under traditional, or financial, accrual accounting, shorn of the economic
performance requirement of I.R.C. § 461(h).
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tive behavior, reasoning that "it's deductible" although not payable
until well into the future. 150
Solidifying the deduction, however, may be taken as an admission
of guilt, assuming the taxpayer's income tax records are accessible.
For publicly traded companies, the solidified deductions may need
to be reported in securities filings.' 51 On one hand, the liability to
correct the behavior may be largely avoided if it is so far in the
future as to be trivialized by discounting it to its present value. 152
On the other hand, if the taxpayer is a corporation, liquidating the
corporation will generally trigger a tax liability that will reverse the
prior deduction.'15
Claiming the deduction does not assure that the taxpayer will fund
the liability by setting aside money to make the indicated future
payment. Should the issue be the subject of an IRS audit, it is
conceivable that the taxpayer and the IRS could enter into a so-
called closing agreementM under which the deduction would be al-
lowed if cash payments were made that corresponded to the deduc-
tion. That speculation would not affect pre-audit behavior.
Case 2:
As a result of section 461(h) of the Code, accrual method taxpayers
cannot deduct the liabilities for correcting their malfeasance until
the correction is made. The implication for our junkyard is that,
unless and until the cleanup is undertaken, it cannot report a de-
duction. Thus, the company has no incentive to save for clean-up
expenses or to pay insurance premiums to generate a cash reserve.
Once cleanup becomes physically feasible, an incentive arises to clean
up because doing so will produce a current tax deduction. If the
property is so far gone that the correction would be deemed a
160 In a high interest rate environment, however, the discounted future cost of remedying
the malfeasance could be lower than the tax benefit of the current legislation. If the taxpayer
were a corporation paying the general top rate of 34% of taxable income, the value of the
deduction would be 34% of the reported amount. For example, a $1,000 accrued deduction
reduces current year taxes by $340. The further into the future the actual disbursement is
pushed, the lower its real present cost. The higher the interest rate applied to discount a
future disbursement, the lower its present value cost will be.
151 See generally Resource Materials: Fraud, Inside Information, and Fiduciary Duty
under Rule lob-5, A.L.I. (1976).
2 See supra note 150.
1-' See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner (United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.), 460 U.S.
370 (1983). This would not be true if it were liquidated into a parent corporation under I.R.C.
§ 332 (1986).
1- See I.R.C. § 7121 (1986).
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rehabilitation, however, that expense would have to be capitalized. 155
The Code enhances the incentive because the taxpayer may be able
to borrow money, with associated interest expense deductions, to
perform the job. 156
Case 3:
The facts are the same as Case 2, but the taxpayer is on the cash
method. The same results occur as in Case 2 above because the Code
allows no deduction until the year of payment, or later if and to the
extent performance occurs in a later year.157 For example, assume a
corporate taxpayer on the cash method contracted with an outside
company to clean up its toxic wastes at a price of $1 million. The
contract called for paying the $1 million in 1990, but for doing half
the cleanup in 1990, and half in 1991. The corporation may deduct
only $500,000 in 1990; the balance may not be deducted until 1991.
Case 4:
Suppose the taxpayer is subjected to fines or penalties for its
violations. The result is no deduction. 15 Denial of a tax benefit is
appropriate because allowing a deduction would weaken the sting of
the fines or penalties.
Under present tax law, environmentally destructive behavior that
creates a clean-up duty has little tax significance. Regardless of a
taxpayer's method of accounting, the Code allows no tax deduction
until the year the cleanup occurs. In general, this result is reason-
able, because it offers no tax incentive for destructive behavior, and
it creates a tax benefit for engaging in an actual cleanup. It does
nothing, however, to stimulate the taxpayer to set aside funds to
cover the eventual liabilities its actions will generate.
15 The deduction would be available under § 162(a). Section 263 might force capitalization
if the correction made the property suitable for a new use vis-a-vis its status when acquired
by the taxpayer. Compare Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 Tax Ct. Rep.
(CCH) 635 (1950) uith Mt. Morris Drive-In Theater Co. v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 85 (6th
Cir. 1956).
I- I.R.C. § 163 (1986).
167 Id. §263.
'I Id. § 162(f).
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3. The Special Case of Nuclear Decommissioning Costs
One of the rare exceptions to the general rule against deductions
for adding to reserves for future expenses appears in section 468A. 159
This provision permits taxpayers to deduct actual payments made
to reserve funds to pay for future costs of decommissioning nuclear
power plants. Section 468A(b) limits such payments to the lesser of
decommissioning deductions claimed for ratemaking purposes or a
"ruling amount" individually approved by the IRS as an accurate
reflection of future expenses. 16° The earnings of each nuclear decom-
missioning fund are taxable at top corporate rates as if the fund
were a domestic business corporation.'61 The fund is carefully cir-
cumscribed so as to be usable for no other purpose and to assure
that it terminates when its purpose is achieved. 162
From a tax accounting perspective, section 468A is an enlightened
provision because it matches income and expenditures over time,
while limiting the deduction to actual payments into the fund. More-
over, it seems compatible with environmental goals because it en-
courages adequate funding for the potentially enormous costs of
shutting down obsolescent nuclear power plants, a result that is
preferable to the risk that the public might have to bear the eventual
cost. If it has any weakness, it may be that section 468A needs to
be tightened somewhat to make the fund immune from invasion by
the taxpayer or its creditors. Its enlightened tax treatment for
accumulating capitol for cleanup makes section 468A a good model
for funding liabilities for future disbursements to rectify unavoidable
environmental damage from accepted, legitimate business activities
generating and disposing hazardous wastes.
4. The Special Case of Solid Waste Reclamation Costs
Section 468 is a complex section relating to mine closing and solid
waste reclamation. The provision relating to mines parallels that for
solid waste reclamation. The core concept of these section 468 pro-
visions is to grant taxpayers a current deduction for the costs of
reclaiming waste sites and closing mines.'6 The amount of the de-
duction is calculated by a sinking fund approach, the effect of which
,59 Id. § 468A; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.468A-0 to -8 (1988).
160 See I.R.C. § 468A(d)(2) (1986) for the definition of the term "ruling amount."
161 Id. § 468A(e).
162 Id.
163 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 875 (1984) (referring to new I.R.C.
§ 468).
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is to grant relatively smaller tax deductions in the early years to
accommodate growth of the reserve funds that resulted from the
taxpayer's contributions to the fund over the years. 164
No actual payment into the reserve is needed in order to claim
the deduction. The deduction is permissible, however, only if the
reclamation involves a property reclaimed under a permit issued
pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act as amended by RCRA, 165
or similar federal, state, or local laws. The Code excludes any waste
site that a taxpayer disturbs after it is listed on the National Prior-
ities List (NPL) under section 105 of CERCLA. 166 This exclusion
has the effect of barring a current deduction for response or reme-
diation costs required under the Superfund program for NPL sites,
and thus might encourage private site cleanup to preempt listing of
the site on the NPL.
Mine closing activities must be conducted in accordance with a
reclamation plan submitted pursuant to sections 511 or 528 of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977167 and made
part of a surfacing mining and reclamation permit granted under
Title V of that Act. Alternatively, the closing may be conducted
pursuant to a plan submitted under a substantially similar state or
federal law containing permit requirements. 168 The Code delegates
the power to control the nature of the reclamation or closing activity
to those closest to the scene, but local control can result in a lack of
uniformity among the states.
In the worst case, a well-intentioned mining operation that accu-
mulated cash reserves for eventual closing costs would get no current
deduction because it failed to qualify under a rigorous regimen. In
contrast, a taxpayer that did not intend to comply with actual closing
requirements would get a current deduction for an act it never
performed because it formally complied with a relaxed state stan-
dard. Eventual nonperformance would be punished by reporting the
reserve as gross income in the year of nonperformance, but the tax
cost of doing so might be minor because the burden arises so far in
the future. A requirement that the reserve be funded and escrowed
11 For a general explanation of the sinking-fund concept, see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 6.08
(1988).
165 Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (latest codification
after 1984 amendments). See also I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(B) (1986).
'6 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1986); I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1986).
' 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (1986).
163 I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(A)(ii).
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would solve this problem by matching cost contributions to the es-
crow account with the permissible deductions.
The mine closing and solid waste reclamation deduction is a so-
phisticated form of reserve accounting, but it fails to require actual
contributions to fund the reserve. As such, it suffers a serious weak-
ness, given the possibility that the taxpayer may be defunct by the
time the duty to pay actually arises. It is good tax accounting but
arguably offends public policy.
5. Corporate Tax Provisions Relating to Undercapitalized
Subsidiaries
A major practical problem involved in abstractions about allocating
the burden of liabilities associated with toxic wastes is the waste
producer's ability to pay. State corporate laws are notorious for
allowing minimal capitalization of corporations. The only firm cor-
porate law limitations involve prohibitions on paying dividends that
would render the payor corporation insolvent. 169
Rational business corporations engaged in environmentally risky
activities will, all things being equal, isolate those activities in sep-
arate subsidiary corporations. As a matter of general law, courts
will not impute to the parent the corporate liability of a subsidiary.
Nevertheless, a subsidiary is considered an asset of the parent that
can be reached by a judgment creditor of that parent corporation.
Locating risky activity in the parent makes the subsidiary an asset
that can be reached by judgment creditors. Rational businesses will
avoid such a structure, and locate the activity in a subsidiary.
The Code does nothing to discourage formation and reshuffling of
subsidiaries to minimize environmental liabilities. Section 351 per-
mits tax-deferred contributions of appreciated property to controlled
corporations. 170 These contributions may include property whose
value has declined and been depreciated to an amount lower than its
value. The Treasury maintains, on doubtful authority, that a tax-
free incorporation of such an asset requires a business purpose:' 7'
this requirement hardly presents an obstacle, however, because
"business purposes" include isolation of hazardous activities in sep-
arate corporations. 72
'69 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 890-95 (1983).
17O See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 3 (5th ed. 1987).
171 Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73.
172 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 1 13.09 (1979).
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The Code also facilitates shearing away subsidiaries or breaking
up separate lines of business into separate corporations for distri-
bution to shareholders. 173 On general tax principles, such transac-
tions are taxable as distributions or as gain (or loss) producing
dispositions of stock. 74 Section 355, however, permits nontaxable
corporate division if it is not a "device" to distribute earnings of
either corporation, the resulting corporations are engaged in active
businesses that were conducted for five years before the distribution,
and control of the spun-off company comes to rest in the hands of
shareholders. 175
The interpretation given to the "device" provision176 is especially
troublesome for toxic waste policy. Insulating the parent company
from potential liabilities has been explicitly approved as a valid
business purpose, not a mere "device,"' 77 that justifies spinning off
or otherwise separating the corporate operations. 178
The tax laws facilitate shell games using corporate subsidiaries to
minimize liabilities arising in connection with hazardous wastes.
Given the great difficulties of working out proper regulatory models
for dealing with toxic waste management, the Code should not com-
plicate environmental policy by facilitating tax-free reshuffling of
business enterprises in order to evade their potential liabilities. A
reasonable reform would be to limit tax-free incorporation to those
restructurings that do not entail escape from environmental liabili-
ties, and to restrict section 355 in a similar manner. Such tax reforms
would not be necessary, it should be noted, if the state corporate
law liability system were broad enough to make the "shell game"
defense ineffective.
6. Tax Treatment of Liability Insurance
The tax treatment of purchased liability insurance is well settled.
As long as the coverage has a business purpose, it is deductible (if
at all) under section 162 to the extent that it covers liabilities in the
current year.'79 With similar effect, section 461(b) prevents deduc-
tion in the case of an accrual method taxpayer until the year for
173 I.R.C. § 355 (1986).
7 Id. §§ 301, 1001.
175 The provisions of § 355 are rather intricate; the statement in the text is highly simplified.
17
6 See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 172, 13.06.
177 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-187, 1976-1 C.B. 97; Rev. Rul. 76-527, 1976-2 C.B. 103.
178 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-2 C.B. 77.
179 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942). See also
I.R.C. § 461(g) (1986) (cash method taxpayer).
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which the coverage was purchased. 80 By contrast, a deduction for
self-insurance is impermissible on the theory that no risk transfer
took place. 181
Captive insurance stands in the middle ground between commer-
cial insurance and self-insurance. The tax law surrounding captive
insurance companies is quite well developed, but the concepts are
somewhat complex. For purposes of the overview in this Article,
however, a few general statements can safely be made.
To have insurance for tax purposes-and hence a potential busi-
ness expense deduction for the cost of insurance premiums-both
risk transfer and risk distribution must occur.182 Thus, if an insurance
company is wholly owned by another company, and the insurer
insures only the parent's risk, no tax deduction can be taken for the
premiums paid by the parent.'8 Moreover, a business may not de-
duct alleged premiums that it disguises as reserves, which would
otherwise be nondeductible.8 Insurance premiums against fire,
storm, theft, accident, or other similar losses in the case of a business
are deductible,', but identical payments set aside in a reserve fund
established by a taxpayer are nondeductible on the theory that all
the events that fix the fact of the liability have not taken place.8 6
The tax implications of a conclusion that a transaction produces
insurance rather than a reserve can be dramatic. The distinction
may seem anomalous if one views the two payments as identical in
amount and purpose. A closer look at the principles of risk transfer
and risk distribution may clarify the policy behind the distinction.
a. Risk Transfer
The concept of risk transfer is that another person, and not the
insured, must replace the insured as the bearer of the risk. This
principle renders an alleged transfer of one's own risk to one's sub-
,s I.R.C. § 461(b) (1986).
181 See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981). The essence of
insurance is to transfer the financial risk of the covered event from the purchaser of the
insurance to the seller of the insurance. Because self-insurance does not shift the risk to
another corporation, from a tax policy point of view the self-insuring taxpayer has merely
engaged in reserve accounting.
I" Carnation Co. v. Commissioners, 71 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 400 (1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010
(9th Cir. 1981). The rationale is that without both operational results the practical effect is
merely self-insurance.1
1
3 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 1010 (1987).
184 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1988).
111 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942).
m See generally Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
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sidiary defective; the risk remains with the real party in interest.
The IRS asserts that there is no risk transfer, and hence, no deduc-
tion, when a subsidiary company insures its parent company's risk.187
The Tax Court explicitly supports this view in the case of a wholly
owned subsidiary that insures only its parent company's risk, and
not the risk of unrelated companies.l'8 But the Tax Court also sug-
gests that there may be risk transfer where at least fifty percent of
the subsidiary company's premiums are received from unrelated
companies.8l 9
b. Risk Distribution
The risk distribution effect of insurance operates through the
diversification of risks. When the law of numbers applies, unusually
favorable and unusually harmful experiences tend to balance each
other. In theory, unless the pool contains a sufficient diversity of
risks, the law of numbers cannot apply.
The Tax Court asserts that all of the risks can be of a related
corporation. 90 It has not said how many risks are enough or how
one tells whether the law of numbers is operating; apparently the
court would be satisfied by the application of insurance industry
standards, whatever they may be. 19' For example, the Tax Court in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner relied heavily on the tax and nontax
literature of the insurance industry for conceptual guidance and gave
every indication that it would accept prevailing industry standards
to solve the riddles of when there is enough diversification. 19 2 The
court distinguished insurance from the establishment of reserves,
indicating that additions to such reserves would be nondeductible.0 3
Another logical requirement for deduction is that the insurance
company has to be reasonably able to pay if a casualty occurs. 194 If
the "insurer" is unable to pay, in substance no insurance exists. This
result relates to the principle of risk distribution, for only through
187 Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53. The parent and subsidiary companies are considered
to be members of the same economic family. Id. at 53-56.
I's Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 948 (1985), aff'd, 811
F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
1 GulfOil, 89 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) at 1027 n.14. (relying on Rev. Rul. 80-120, 1980-1 C.B.
41). The one-half figure is an arbitrary, Solomonic threshold.
190 Id. at 1026.
191 See id. at 1022-27.
9 See id. at 1025-27 & nn.9-15.
1 See id. at 1023-24, 1030.
194 See O'Brien & Tung, Captive Off-Shore Insurance Corporations, 31 ANN. N.Y.U. TAX
INST. 665, 684-85 (1973).
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a pooling of premiums for diverse risks can the insuring entity
acquire sufficient capital to cover a major loss. \
The situation in which there is virtual certainty that the risk will
eventually materialize presents a teasing problem in the insurance
area. In such cases, one would assume that a portion of the premiums
is equivalent to a reserve for future expenses and should not be
deductible. The insurance experts evidently think in terms of uncer-
tain risks, 195 as opposed to certainties. One can insure, for example,
the risk of a nuclear power plant being struck by lightning, as
opposed to the plant gradually becoming radioactively "hot." One
wonders if there might be borderline cases where some premiums
that are really in the nature of reserves against sure things might
be deductible as payments to cover uncertainties, for example, a
policy that covered a nuclear power plant prematurely becoming
"hot."196
Commercial coverage may become unavailable just when taxpay-
ers need it most. In recent years, for example, virtually no com-
mercial insurance has been available for environmental liabilities
associated with industrial activity. 197 If self-insurance and reserve
accounting do not afford tax deductions for coverage of environmen-
tal risks, the economics of the particular situation may drive the
taxpayer to risk all by "going bare"-not funding the risk. The risk
may be attractive if a modestly capitalized subsidiary is used,
thereby potentially minimizing the real economic risk to the tax-
payer. This highly undesirable outcome is exacerbated by state cor-
porate laws that enable shareholders to avoid personal liability for
corporate acts and to drain the corporation of operating profits,
leaving a "suit-proof" malfeasor.
The potential of uninsured risks poses difficult policy choices. One
alternative is to proscribe or sharply limit the activity that produces
the risk. Another is to facilitate self-insurance by setting clear fed-
eral standards in the form of "safe harbor" rules, which, if satisfied,
can assure the taxpayer that a deduction will be available. Opponents
of such a scheme can be expected to argue that, if industry members
are not willing to engage in risk-pooling on their own, the activity
should not be subsidized. That argument fails, however, to take
1
95 See A. WILLETT, THE ECONOIuC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 72 (1951).
'9 There seem to be no litigated cases on point and the window of opportunity for crafty
taxpayers seems narrow.
'97 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ISSUES SUR-
ROUNDING INSURANCE AVAILABmLITY 17-27 (1987).
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account of the overall economic and social utility of the industry.l 8
It also overlooks the possibility of blending a variety of risks under
one insurance premium, a step that is sometimes taken in the name
of social policy even though it contradicts sound actuarial principles
and full internalization of costs. Determining which economic activ-
ities to "subsidize" is, to be sure, a perplexing question as a matter
of both theory and political choice. Its very perplexity suggests the
desirability of reform through a specially tailored federal statute
that balances the competing policies.
Another approach would be to provide federal insurance against
disasters involving toxic wastes, and to allow a tax deduction for
contributions to purchase such insurance. The appeal of such an
approach would be broad risk-pooling, with a greater likelihood of
appropriate risk-shifting because the large number of participants
should even out the actual types of liabilities that come home to
roost as disasters.
In this difficult and speculative field, two certainties stand out: (1)
private insurance is frequently unavailable; and (2) barring scientific
miracles, taxpayers will continue to conduct activities that will gen-
erate hazardous wastes and their attendant liabilities that our en-
vironmental, tort, and corporate laws cannot prevent. Providing
federal insurance bends to those realities. The benefit is that the
government as insurer can insist on appropriate minimum standards
of conduct that should operate as a healthy control on irresponsible
actors. In fact, if insurance is made a condition of permission to do
business, and government insurance is available only upon compli-
ance with environmental regulations, polluters that fail to abide by
the rules and thereby lose insurance coverage would be forced to
shut down.'99
The Code's application to environmental liability insurance is tra-
ditional. Section 162 deductions might be denied on indirect public
198 For example, the nuclear weapons industry would probably adopt a more responsible
attitude about health and environmental protection if government removed the shield of
sovereign immunity. Without soverign immunity, private nuclear weapons contractors would
need to cover new financial liabilities, but they would face the same obstacles to commercial
insurance or risk pooling that their compatriots in the civilian nuclear energy industry faced
and perhaps greater ones.
199 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, for example, requires insurance coverage
as a condition for receiving a permit to operate a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal facility. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a), (t) (1986). The collapse of the commercial insurance
market prevented some facilities from continuing to operate, leading in turn to a highly
concentrated, essentially oligarchical, waste management industry. A government-run insur-
ance fund might have alleviated these problems and fostered a more competitive industrial
structure, without any diminution in the efforts to protect the environment.
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policy grounds as "extraordinary, '20 0 but that result is unlikely.
Where insurance is unavailable, it may be wise to modify the Code
to facilitate industry-wide risk-pooling mechanisms that would pro-
duce deductions for actuarially reasonable contributions to the pool.
The fund might operate on a tax-deferred or currently taxable basis.
Federal insurance could be provided selectively where the private
market is unable to meet the demand for insurance from accepted,
legitimate businesses. Premiums that paid for such insurance should
be currently deductible.
IV. CONCLUSION
The discord between generally accepted environmental values and
statutorily prescribed environmental policies on the one hand, and
the Code on the other, is remarkable. Major rethinking of the rela-
tionship between the two is definitely in order.
Formal institutional intervention to bring environmental policy
objectives to the attention of the tax code writers is the first nec-
essary step. Tax legislative process should include an advisory ser-
vice whose role is to consider the environmental impact of future
tax legislation. A good place to put the watchdog would be in the
Joint Committee on Taxation. Candidates for the role of advisor
include designated groups within the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, or perhaps the Congressional Research Service. Tax legisla-
tion originating in the Treasury Department should be reviewed by
the President's Council on Environmental Quality before submission
to Congress. For major proposals, a NEPA environmental impact
statement should be prepared.
In addition to making changes in the legislative process, Congress
should amend several portions of the Code. In particular, no tax
deduction should be allowed for business expenses that conflict with
significant environmental policies. An amendment to section 162 of
the Code to deny deductions for such expenditures could accomplish
general conformity. The exact language of the amendment would
have to be carefully worded to avoid de minimis cases and to keep
pace with scientific and legislative developments.
As part of the effort to resolve inconsistencies between the Code
and environmental policies, Congress should also repeal percentage
depletion for extracting asbestos and cut back or repeal the allow-
ances for extracting lead, mercury, uranium, and sulphur. In a better
21 See text accompanying supra note 51.
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world, Congress would limit aggregate percentage depletion in all
cases to the taxpayer's investment in the mineral property.
In addition to correcting negative tax consequences for the envi-
ronment, Congress should enact positive measures to induce safe
and clean industrial procedures. Accordingly, while retaining the
basic structure of section 169, Code revisions should enhance the
incentives for installing new pollution control facilities.
Finally, the IRS, in conjunction with Congress, should reconsider
its approach to the reserve method of accruing liabilities for future
pollution control activities. In general, the nuclear decommissioning
rules provide an appropriate model in which current deductions are
allowed for current cash contributions to a dedicated fund. The
funds, however, should be placed beyond the reach of creditors. A
federal deposit system would be one good way to assure that the
funds are not deflected from their intended use.
The intimate connection between tax and corporation laws compels
a reevaluation of current laws on incorporation and corporate struc-
ture, as well as of the Code. Above all, the corporate laws relating
to undercapitalized high liability subsidiaries should be modified. It
should not be possible for a prosperous parent corporation to place
its environmentally risky activities in a weakly capitalized subsid-
iary. Tax considerations are a minor factor here; this problem should
be addressed head on with nontax legislation.
Ultimately, as with most broad-scale social and economic activi-
ties, insurance against unexpected and unintended environmental
consequences plays a significant role. For activities with high envi-
ronmental risk, pooled liability insurance arrangements should be
encouraged. The real problems are not the tax law's restriction on
the definition of deductible insurance payments, but the absence of
reserve accounting and the collapse of the commercial market to
insure against environmental hazards. In preference to a prolifera-
tion of uninsured risks, a federal insurance program should be cre-
ated to provide coverage against such liabilities. In addition, self-
insurance through establishing properly protected cash reserves can
promote environmental protection and cleanup without disrupting
accepted notions of insurable risks.
This brief and selective overview of tax code implications for
private actions to protect and improve the environment reveals a
wealth of contradictions and disincentives. Although special taxes
and fees can sometimes be used to promote very specific pollution
control objectives, general tax policy cannot carry the burden of
environmental policy. The endeavor of this Article has been to illu-
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minate some instances in which tax policy, usually inadvertently,
works against important environmental policies that the United
States is spending billions to accomplish. In the process, this Article
has also uncovered some constructive elements in the Code that
appear to facilitate sound industrial practices. What emerges most
clearly from both the negative and the positive findings is the clear
need to integrate environmental policy with the design and revision
of the tax code. No federal law has the pervasive reach and the
direct bottom-line impact of the tax code. As a result, it should be
applied consciously and coherently to encourage and facilitate sound
environmental practices in all areas of American business.
